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of pain and also the nature of money. The problem of equating the two to afford
reasonable and just compensation calls for a high order of ]udgment, and the law
has provided no better yardstick for your gudance than your enlightened con-
science. Your problem is not one of mathematical calculation, but involves an
exercise of your sound judgment of what is fair and nght, based on your com-
mon knowledge as mdividuals.52
An instruction such as that proposed, or any of the above arguments may be
helpful to the defendant's counsel. But no argument or instruction yet devised
seems to be capable of overcoming the effectiveness of the per diem argument
which has proven itself to be one of the most successful courtroom techniques to
have been advanced in personal injury cases. However, the defense has not rested,
nor should it rest until a means is developed to overcome this inherently ms-
leading form of argument which results in awards reached through illusory mathe-
matical calculations rather than common sense and reason.
Maurice R. Jourdane*
52 The text of this instruction it taken partially from an instruction expressed m the
Flonda decision of Braddock v. Seaboard Air Lane R.1., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955) and
partially from dicta in Beagle v. Vasold, 65 A.C. 161, 53 Cal. Bptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673
(1966).
*Member, Second Year Class.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN CALIFORNIA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW-QUINTAL V. LAUREL
GROVE HOSPITAL
The law of medical malpractice has not yet reached the stage of holding
physicians and surgeons absolutely liable for every untoward result which may
occur in their practice.' The injured plaintiff has the difficult task of proving
negligence on the part of the doctor. He is often handicapped by the reluctance
of doctors to testify against their brethren and usually has little knowledge of
what actually transpired because of the inherent complexity of medical matters
or because he was unconscious when the injury occurred. 2 The doctrine of res tpsa
loquitur has proved to be an effective "instrument" in aiding the plaintiff to
overcome these obstacles.8
1Clark v. Gibbons, 240 A.C.A. 776, 790, 50 Cal. Rptr. 127, 136 (1966). Some
commentators believe the effect of res tpsa m California is to impose a rule of strict
liability on the medical profession. See, e.g., Adamson, Medical Malpractice, Misuse of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MnN. L. REv. 1043 (1962).
2 Judicial recognition of the obstacles which face the injured plaintiff is found in
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Umv., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d, 170, 175 (1957).
Modern discovery procedure has helped the plaintiff to secure evidence but has not
diminished the value of res ipsa to the injured patient. See Louisell & Williams, Res
Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical Malpractice, 48 CAxa. L. BEv. 252, 254 (1960).
3 Louisell & Williams, supra note 2, at 255.
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The res ipsa doctrine is simply one of circumstantial evidence which permits
the jury to infer negligence from the mere occurrence of the accident itself when
certain requirements are satisfied.4 The usual procedural effect of res spsa is to
create an inference of negligence which is considered "permissive" since the jury
need not draw the inference and may find for the defendant even though he
remains silent.5 In medical malpractice cases, however, because of the special
relationship of doctor and patient the effect of the doctrine is to impose a manda-
tory burden upon the defendant to rebut the inference of negligence.6 The effect
in some cases is to shift the burden of proof to the doctor.7
In Califoria res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accidnt is of such a
nature that it can be said in the light of past experience that it was probably the
result of negligence by someone and (2) the defendant is probably the person
who is responsible.8 This is a modem restatement of the first trae'tional require-
ment of res zpsa that the accident must be of the type which d( , not ordinarily
occur in the absence of someone's negligence and of the seco. I traditional re-
quirement that the defendant must be in the exclusive control of the instrumen-
tality causing the injury 9 An erosion of the exclusive control requirement in the
field of medical malpractice occurred relatively early.10 Nevertheless, the require-
ment is by no means mumaterial today as the plaintiff must show where the
4 Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAI.Wr. L. REv. 183, 191 (1949).
6 Professor Prosser maintains that the doctrine in the usual case produces only an
inference of negligence and enables the plaintiff to at least get to the jury. Prosser, supra
note 4, at 234. It appears that California courts speak of the effect in terms of presump-
tion which would indicate that the defendant must offer some type of explanation or
lose his case. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 688, 268 P.2d 1041, 1044
(1954). Under the new Evidence Code presumptions are no longer evidence; they are
assertions of fact required by law. CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 600. Under CAL.. EvmENcE
CoDE § 603 the res %psa presumption would be considered as one merely effecting the
burden of producing evidence. See Witkin, Evidence § 264 (2d ed. 1966). Thus, the
defendant must rebut the plamtiffs case by introducing evidence that would support a
finding that he was not negligent. See WrrxN, EvIDENcE § 270 (2d ed. 1966).
6Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal. 2d 290, 295, 188 P.2d 12, 15 (1947);
Gerhardt v. Fresno Medical Group, 217 Cal. App. 2d 353, 360, 31 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638
(1963).
7 E.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Umv., 154 Cal. App. 2d, 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957). Some argue that such a shift is justified on grounds of simplicity, the moral
obligation of the doctor to disclose pertinent information and the special responsibility
of the doctor toward his patient. Prosser, supra note 4, at 223. Louisell & Williams,
supra note 2, at 255-256.8 Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 836, 372 P.2d 97 (1962); Zentz v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. 39 Cal. 2d 436, 446, 247 P.2d 344, 349 (1952).
9 9 WiGMom, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940). The third element of the tradi-
tional res ipsa scheme, namely that the plaintiff did not voluntarily contribute to his
injury, is usually not important in medical malpractice cases. Rubsamen, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Law-Expanson of a Doctrine to the
Bursting Point, 14 STAx. L. REv. 251, 252 (1962).10 In the famous case of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 436 (1944)
the "exclusive control" idea gave way because multiple defendants were each held to
have the "right of control."
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responsibility for the injury probably lies.1 Most of the recent controversy, how-
ever, concerns res tpsas first requirement. 1 2
It is settled in California and a minority of jurisdictions that the jury may use
either their own knowledge and experience or expert testimony as a basis for
concluding that the accident is of such a nature that it was probably the result
of negligence.'3 Traditionally, res tpsa applies where lay common knowledge and
experience would dictate that the mere occurrence of the accident was indicative
of negligence. 14 In medical malpractice, a highly techmcal area, lay common
knowledge may be utilized to satisfy the first requirement of res tpsa in certain
cases. Common cases include objects left in the patient's body at the time of sur-
gery and the removal of the wrong part of the body when another part was in-
tended.' 5 The re-Jm of lay common knowledge naturally grew,' 6 but not without
limits' 7 or advere comment.'8 Most jurisdictions confine res zpsa in medical mal-
11Inouye v. 2, ek, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965), 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 359.
12 Note, 38 So. CAL. L. BEv. 740, 742 (1965).
13 In Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 836, 372 P.2d 97, 98 (1962) the court
put to rest any doubts as to the availability of expert testimony in a medical malpractice
res %psa case by overruling a statement in EngeZlkng v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 221, 88
P.2d 695, 698 (1939) that res tpsa only applied where a layman is able to say as a
matter of common knowledge that the injury would not have occurred absent negli-
gence. Other jurisdictions have also allowed expert testimony to be employed. E.g.,
Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W.2d 255 (1963); Homer v. Northern Pac.
Beneficial Ass'n Hosp., 62 Wash. 2d 351, 382 P.2d 518 (1963).
14 Prosser, supra note 4, at 191.
'5 E.g., Inouye v. Black, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965); Thomp-
sen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal. App. 2d 235, 79 P.2d 136 (1938). See also LouisELL & Wm-
LIAs, TAL or MEDicAL MAPncAric CASES § 14.06 (1960). Relatively recent cases
in which the injury was held to be within the realm of lay common knowledge include;
Davis v. Memorial Hosp., 58 Cal. 2d 815, 376 P.2d 561 (1962) (infection following
enema); Ragusano v. Civic Center Hosp. Foundation, 199 Cal. App. 2d 586, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 118 (1962) (paralysis of leg following routine child birth).
16 Louis=r & WiLaAis, supra note 15, § 14.02.
17 The courts have held that the nature of the following injuries are beyond the
realm of lay common knowledge: Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97
(1962) (fistula following a hysterectomy); Campos v. Weeks, 245 A.C.A. 707, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 915 (1966) (shock following injection of pemcillin); Clark v. Gibbons, 240
A.C.A. 776, 50 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1966) (premature wearing off of local anesthetic and
resulting complications); Crawford v. County of Sacramento, 239 Cal. App. 2d 791, 49
Cal. Bptr. 115 (1966) (cardiac arrest while patient under anesthesia); Edelman v.
Ziegler, 233 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965) (cardiac arrest while patient
under anesthesia); LaMere v. Goren, 233 Cal. App. 2d 799, 43 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965)
(paralysis following injection of novacame); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Umv., 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) (paralysis following aortography).
18 In 14 STAir. L. RBv. 251, 276 (1962) the author strongly criticized the notion
expressed in Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1957) that "It is a
matter of common knowledge among laymen that injections in the arm, as well as other
portions of the body do not ordinarily cause trouble unless unskillfully done or there
is something wrong with the serum." Id. at-835, 337 P.2d at 72. A retreat from Marsh
is found in the following cases involving injections where the court held that lay coin-
NOTES
THE HAST[NGS LAW JOURNAL
practice to cases involving blatant medical errors because lay knowledge can be
utilized in these situations. 19 California, however, in a complex medical situation
where the matter lies beyond the pale of lay common knowledge, allows expert
testimony.2 ° In this situation, the jury can apply the doctrine only if there is evi-
dence that it is common knowledge among experts that a given injury would not
occur absent negligence.21 In the esoteric area of medical causation much confu-
sion exists concerning the nature of the evidence which is sufficient for laying a
foundation for res spsa.
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital
Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital=2 Is the latest Califorma Supreme Court
decision in which the doctrine of res zpsa loquitur is applied to medical malprac-
tice. The plaintiff, a youth of six, entered the defendant hospital for the purpose
of having an eye condition corrected by a mmor operation. During the admims-
tration of the anesthetic and before surgery had commenced the plaintiff suffered
a cardiac arrest. The defendant ophthalmologist considering himself incompetent to
perform a thoracotomy rushed out of the operating room where he luckily en-
countered a surgeon who performed the 'operation and restored the heart action.
The outcome was tragic since the youth suffered severe brain damage as a
consequence of the lack of oxygen and blood to is brain during the arrest.
The trial court had granted judgment for the defendants notwithstanding the
verdict. The appellate court affirmed this decision.23 The supreme court reversed
and concluded that, independently of the doctrine of res ipsa, there was evidence
sufficient to sustain a verdict for plamtiff.2 4 The significance of the opinion, how-
ever, was the decision that the jury on retrial should be instructed on res ,psa.25
Chief Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority view
that a res zpsa instruction would be proper, although he did admit that there was
sufficient evidence to permit a finding of negligence independent of res Zpsa.26
Justice McComb dissented on the basis of the district court's opinion that res %psa
was not applicable and that there was a lack of evidence of negligence inde-
pendent of res zpsa.2 7
Quintal was an "expert res zpsa" case. That is, expert testimony was necessary
mon knowledge could not be utilized: Campos v. Weeks, 53 Cal. Rptr. 915, 245 A.CA.
707 (1966) (shock following an injection of penicillin); Surabian v. Lorenz, 229 Cal.
App. 2d, 462, 40 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1964) (adverse reaction to a mandibular injection of
an anesthetic).
-9 See cases collected m Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1962).
2 0 Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97 (1962).
21 "The more esoteric ands of medical causation demand expert testimony." Inouye
v. Black, 238 Cal. App. 2d 31, 47 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1965). Attorneys have also recog-
nized the need for an expert in this situation. 7 BELIu, TmiAIzi ToRT TnEims 201
(1962).
22 62 Cal. 2d, 154,41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 397 P.2d 161 (1964).
2a Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1964).
2 4 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 160, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582, 397
P.2d 161, 166 (1964).25 Justice Mosk would have reversed the order granting the defendant's a new
trial. Id. at 169, 41 Cal. Rptr. 586, 397 P.2d at 170 (concurring opinion).
26 Id. at 170, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 587, 397 P.2d at 171 (concurring opinion).
27 Id. at 175, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 590, 397 P.2d at 164 (dissenting opinion).
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to lay a foundation for the doctrine since the possible causes of cardiac arrests
were not a matter of common knowledge. 28 The plaintiff did not produce inde-
pendent expert witnesses, but relied upon the cross examination of defendants
themselves and their expert witnesses.29 Unlike some cases,30 m which the medi-
cal expert witness admitted that the injury was not only rare but usually would
not occur in the absence of negligence, there was no expert testimony that when
a cardiac arrest does occur under similar circumstances negligence is more prob-
ably than not the cause.31 The majority failed to consider the lack of such testi-
mony as fatal and allowed the instruction of res ipsa on the basis of direct evi-
dence of negligence elicited from the defendants and their witnesses.32 The
decision to operate in a non-emergency situation when the patient had fever and
was agitated and the surgeon's lack of ability to perform a thoractomy or his
failure to at least have another surgeon present in case of an emergency are exam-
pies of specific negligent acts present in the case, which would support a finding
of negligence.33 According to Chief Justice Traynor the majority misplaced its
reliance on such evidence as a basis for the res ipsa instruction.34 Furthermore,
he referred to expert testimony that when due care is exercised cardiac arrests
do not ordinarily occur. This type of testimony, he said, established only that a
cardiac arrest is a rare occurrence and nothing more.35
The majority admitted that a cardiac arrest was a calculated risk in the giv-
mg of a general anesthetic.3 6 However, after noting that the injury was rare the
court disregarded the calculated risk issue and held that since proof of specific
negligent acts was present a res ipsa instruction would be proper.3 7 The majority
in Quntal apparently sanctioned an erroneous conception of res spsa loquitur
which found expression in earlier cases.38 According to Quntal a plaintiff who
suffers a rare injury will be entitled to a res %psa instruction in addition to Ins
prima facie case based on specific negligence notwithstanding that the risk of the
injury is considered to be inherent or calculated.3 9 Such a conclusion in effect
28 Id. at 170, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 587, 397 P.2d at 171 (concurring opinion).
29 Id. at 159, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 580, 397 P.2d at 164. The plaintiff may cross examine
the defendant doctor and his expert witnesses in order to lay the necessary foundation
for res ipsa. See Costa v. Regents of Umv. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85
(1953).30 E.g., Senens v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 819, 291 P.2d 915, 919 (1955).
31 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 587, 397
P.2d 161, 171 (1964) (concurring opinon).
32 Id. at 164, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 583, 397 P.2d at 166.
33 Id. at 161, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 582, 397 P.2d at 166.
34 Id. at 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 587, 397 P.2d at 171 (concurring opinion).
85 Ibid.
36 Id. at 160, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 582, 397 P.2d at 166.
87 Id. at 164, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 583, 397 P.2d at 166.
as Salgo v. Leland Stanford Umv., 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957);
Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959). See generally Rubsamen,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Law-Expansion of a Doctrine to
the Bursting Point, 14 SrA. L. Rsv. 251 (1962).
39 In Edelman v. Zeigler, 233 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965) the
court observed that in Quzntal a "combination of rarity and particular acts produced
the court's conclusion that a res ipsa loquitur instructions should have been given." Id.
at 882, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
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eliminates the first requirement of res ipsa in medical malpractice. In a state
where plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions rely on the doctrine often,40 the
law of res ipsa in light of Quintal should be examined. '
Specific Evmdence of Negligence as a Foundation for Res Ipsa Loquitur
It is established that a res zpsa loquitur case is a circumstantial evidence case
which permits the jury to infer negligence from the mere occurrence itself.41
Proof of specific acts of negligence should be disregarded in deciding whether or
not a res zpsa instruction should be given.42
In other words, in a res ipsa case the ultimate fact, some kind of negligence is
inferred without any evidential facts except the unusual occurrence itself; while
in a specific negligence case there must be evidential facts sufficient to show some
negligent acts or omissions wich were the proximate cause of the occurrence. 43
Chief Justice Traynor noted that the majority in Quintal relied on specific
acts of negligence (such as the delay in performing the thoractomy) as a basis
for the application of res ipsa.44 He, however, observed that it is irrelevant that
there may be facts other than the occurrence itself to suggest that the arrest was
caused by negligence. Although such facts, if present, might be independent
proof of negligence, they have no bearing on the question whether the jury
should be permitted to draw an inference of negligence on the happening of the
cardiac arrest alone.45
In a complex medical malpractice case where the causes of the injury are
beyond the pale of lay common knowledge the jury is usually instructed:
whether the injury is one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of neg-
ligence is to be determined from the evidence presented in this trial by physi-
cians and surgeons called as expert witnesses.46
Obviously, the only testimony referred to is that having a bearing on the issue of
whether in light of the expert's past experience the mere happening of a certain
injury is indicative of negligence. According to Chief Justice Traynor the only
question relevant in Quintal was whether or not evidence had been offered by
expert testimony that when cardiac arrests do occur, they are more probably than
not caused by negligence.47
40 Califormia far surpasses any other state in the total number of res ipsa medical
malpractice cases. See Note, 60 MicH. L. REv. 1153, 1157 (1962).
41 Prosser, supra note 4, at 191.42 
"[In considering the propriety of the res ipsa loquitur instructions we have, of
course, disregarded the direct evidence of negligence " Stanford v. Richmond
Chase Co., 43 Cal. 2d 287, 293, 272 P.2d 764, 767 (1954) knonmalpractice case). In
Dees v. Pace, 118 Cal. App. 2d 284, 257 P.2d 756 (1953) (malpractice case) the court
observed that an alleged admission by the doctor that the needle went into the bladder
"would be evidence of a specific act of negligence and would not afford a basis for the
giving of instructions on res ipsa loquitur." Id. at 290, 257 P.2d at 759.
43 Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (1934).
44 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 587,
397 P.2d 161, 171 (1964) (concurring opinion).
45 Ibid.46 Boox OF APPRovED JuRY INsTiUcT0N, 214 W
47 Quntal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 171, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 587, 397
P.2d 161, 171 (1964) (concurring opinion).
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Quintal was not the first decision to allow a res tpsa instruction to be based
upon a showing of particular deviations from the degree of skill ordinarily exer-
cised by physicians and surgeons in the community. In Wolfsmith V. Marsh48 a
res ipsa instruction was allowed on the basis of evidence indicating a specific
negligent act, namely the giving of an injection into a vencose vein. In Salgo v.
Leland Stanford University49 the plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that the
needle was inserted into the wrong location, but none of the witnesses testified
that paralysis would not ordinarily occur in the performance of an aortography
unless someone had been negligent.50 A res zpsa instruction was nevertheless given.
Recent California appellate court decisions have also followed Quintal. In
LaMere v. Goren5' an injection of novacame resulted in the paralysis of plaintiff's
arm. Expert testimony was introduced that the needle was too large and that
an injection of novacame under the circumstances was not good medical proce-
dure in the community.52 The court admitted that none of the medical witnesses
stated that this is the type of injury which ordinarily does not occur m the ab-
sence of negligence.5 3 But since the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of
negligence based on direct evidence of negligence he was given the benefit of
the doctrine. In Edelman v. Zeigler54 the plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest during
the course of a laparotomy. A res zpsa instruction was given notwithstanding
defendant's contention that expert testimony was not related to the general
proposition that such arrests do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negli-
gence, 55 but was related to specific asserted negligence, namely the failure to
bag feed.55
In other recent Califoria appellate court decisions57 the courts were im-
pressed by the lack of direct evidence of negligence and on that ground refused
to grant a res %psa instruction.
Qutntal has not made a significant change in medical malpractice law. Since
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case based on specific acts of negligence
res %psa m many cases is no great boon to him. However, in some cases where
the specific evidence of negligence is weak 58 the plaintiff will indeed reap bene-
4851 Cal. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959).
49 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
50 "There was no medical testimony upon which res ipsa loquitur could be based
unless it be Dr. Edmeads' testimony that the needle may have been inserted in the
wrong place." Id. at 571, 317 P.2d at 177.
51233 Cal. App. 2d 799, 43 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1965).
52 Id. at 809, 43 Cal. Rptr. 900.
53 Id. at 810, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
54233 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965).
55 Id. at 882, 44 Cal. Rptr. 121.
56 Bag feeding is squeezing the breathing bag by hand.
57 Crawford v. County of Sacramento, 239 Cal. App. 2d 791, 798, 49 Cal. Rptr.
115, 120 (1966); Clark v. Gibbons, 240 A.C.A. 776, 789, 50 Cal. Rptr. 127, 135 (1966).
Both of these cases were similar to Quintal in that they involved an unfortunate result
following the administration of an anesthetic. The Clark case has been granted a hear-
ing by the California Supreme Court.
58 In Tomei v. Henning, 248 A.C.A. 151, 56 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1967) the court held
that the injured plaintiff was entitled to a res %psa instruction on the basis of medical
testimony indicating only one asserted act of negligence (the doctor's failure to locate
and the tying off of the ureters while performing a hysterectomy). Justice Draper, in a
vigorous dissent, considered the court's application of res spsa based on the evidence of
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fits under the Quintal doctrine. He will be able to "tack" a res zpsa instruction
onto an alleged act of negligence and then force the doctor to either come for-
ward with an explanation or compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.
Rarity v. Calculated Risk
The first requirement of res ipsa loquitur, namely that the accident be of a
land which does not ordinarily occur absent negligence, was satisfied at one time
m California by a mere showing that the injury rarely occurred.5 9 The fact that
a particular injury ordinarily did not occur was considered proof that when such
injury did occur it was probably caused by negligence. 60 Thus, the rarity of the
injury was deemed an adequate substitute for lay common knowledge and expert
testimony. Such judicial reasoning did not escape criticism 6 ' and in Siverson v.
Weber62 the California Supreme Court apparently retreated from the rarity
principle.
Siverson involved a fistula following a hysterectomy. The court noted that
fistulas may occur even though the surgeon was not at fault.6 3 In other words, the
injury was considered to be an inherent or calculated risk of the operation which
could not be diminished by the exercise of due care.64 The court recognized that
the development of a fistula is also a rare occurrence but dismissed the impor-
tance of the rarity of the injury-
The fact that a particular injury suffered by a patient is something that
rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by the
negligence of those in charge of the operation. Where risks are inherent in
an operation and an injury of a type which is rare does occur, the doctrine
should not be applicable unless it can be said that, in the light of past expen-
ence, such an occurrence is more likely the result of negligence than some cause
for which the defendant is not responsible. 65
The Quintal court apparently revived the rarity principle and disregarded the
calculated risk principle. The, court admitted that a cardiac arrest is a known and
calculated risk in the giving of a general anesthetic.66 But the court concluded
that since the arrest "could occur as a result of negligence" and the occurrence of
an arrest is rare a res zpsa case was established.67 The decision in effect eliminated
the inherent risk principle in medical malpractice cases because expert testimony
one mere alleged act of negligence to be a "misuse of res ipsa." Id. at 157, 56 Cal.
Rptr. at 360. See Edelman v. Ziegler, 233 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965).
59 Rubsamen, supra note 38, at 270.
60 Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Socy, 36 Cal. 2d, 301, 314, 223 P.2d 471,
479 (1950) (dissenting opinon by Chief Justice Traynor).
61 Comment, Siverson v. Weber-A Reconsideration of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medi-
cal Malpractice, 15 STAw. L. Ra. 77 (1963).
62 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97 (1962).
63 Id. at 837, 372 P.2d at 98.
64 Comment, Siverson v. Weber-A Reconsideration of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medi-
cal Malpractice, 15 STAN. L. Rxv. 77 (1963).65 Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 839, 372 P.2d 97, 99 (1962).
66 Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 160, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582, 397
P.2d 161, 166 (1964).
67 Id. at 164, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 583, 397 P.2d at 166.
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that an injury could occur without negligence is of no value so long as the injury
is rare and might occur as a result of negligence.68
Special Relationships and Res Ipsa
The majority in Quintal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a res ipsa
instruction notwithstanding (1) the absence of a basis of experience, either com-
mon to the community or established by an expert, that when injury does occur
it is probably the result of negligence and (2) evidence that the injury is an in-
herent risk in the particular medical transaction. The court in effect disregarded
the first requirement of res zpsa in a medical malpractice case, but this result is
not surprising in light of other recent developments in the law of res wpa.
In Fowler v. Seaton6 9 a young boy sustained serious head m]unes while play-
mg in the defendant's nursery school playground. The California Supreme Court
applied res tpsa apparently even in the absence of a showing that the injury was
probably caused by negligence1 0 The court stressed that the defendant owed a
duty of careful supervision at all times, and concluded that the defendant must
either explain the nature of the accident so as to exculpate himself or suffer an
adverse verdict.71 The dissent argued that the decision in effect mposed absolute
liability on the defendant. 72
The liberal application of res ipsa in Quintal and Fowler can be best under-
stood on grounds of public policy. In both cases because of the relationship be-
tween the parties the defendant owed a special duty to the plaintiff. This special
relationship justified the procedural effect of res zpsa, i.e. shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant. 73 California courts have used res ipsa as a "deliberate
instrument of policy,"74 and, as reflected in Quintal and Fowler, a special re-
lationship between the parties, as a matter of policy, now apparently enables the
plaintiff to establish a res %psa case even though an essential element of the doc-
trne is lacking.7 5 As explained by one court the "increasing use of res ipsa
exemplifies the growing recognition of courts of special obligations which anse
from particular relationships."76
Conclusion
The liberal extension of res zpsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases be-
cause of the special obligation which the physician owes to his patient is intended
68 In Siverson, however, the medical witnesses also recognized that a fistula follow-
mg a hysterectomy might be the result of negligence, but the court stressed that since
the injury might also occur absent negligence it was necessary to show that in the rare
cases where it did occur it was probably the result of negligence. Siverson v. Weber,
57 Cal. 2d, 824, 838-839, 372 P.2d 97, 99 (1962).
6961 Cal. 2d 681, 394 P.2d 697 (1964).
70 Note, 38 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 740, 743 (1965); Note, 17 STAN. L. REv. 768, 771
(1965).71 Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Cal. 2d 681, 688, 394 P.2d 697, 701 (1964).
72 Id. at 691, 394 P.2d at 703 (dissenting opinion).
73 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
74 Prosser, supra note 4, at 212.
75 Of course, the California courts relatively early regarded the classic elements of
res tpsa as flexible. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 436 (1944).76 Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 348, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (1960).
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